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Lee Brobst
lee.eagleeye.brobst@gmail.com
May 1, 2009
A TERRITORY VERSUS THE TERRITORY
A TERRITORY VERSUS THE TERRITORY1
The Supreme Court ruling on the property clause of Art. IV. Sect. 3, cl.2 stated:
Literally, the word “territory”, as used, signifies property, since the language is not
“territory or property”, but “territory or other property.” There arises and evident
difference between the words “the territory” and “a territory” of the United States.
The former merely designates a particular part or parts of the earth’s surface-the
imperially extensive holdings of the Nation; the latter is a governmental subdivision
which happened to be called a “territory” but which quite as well could have been
called a “colony” . . . “province”. . . “A territory, under the Constitution and laws of
United States is an inchoate state’, quoting Ex parte Morgan D.C. 20 Fed 298, 305.
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516 (1933). (Italics in original)
The. An article which particularizes the subject spoken of. “Grammatical niceties
should not be resorted to without necessity; but it would be extending liberality to an
unwarrantable length to confound the articles ‘a’ and ‘the’. The most unlettered
persons understand that ‘a’ is indefinite, but ‘the’ refers to a certain object.” Black’s
Law Dict. 5th ed.
Note: an inchoate state is an incomplete state - - - it has no charter of incorporation,
hence no borders defined as it possess no physical reality existing as a
governmental subdivision which is considered other property of the United
States in the spirit of the law under Art. IV Sec. 3 cl.2. According to Black’s Law Dict.
5th ed., a “governmental subdivision is an agency created to carry out a
governmental purpose or function. See also Administrative agency; governmental
agency.”
It is a well established principle of law that the federal “legislation applies only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears
Caha v. United States 152 US 211, 215 (1894); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. 213 US 347 (1909);United States v. Bowman 260 US 94, 97 (1922);
Blackmer v. United States 284 US 421, 437 (1932). Take note the Court stated: “U.
S citizens living abroad are not questions of international law, but of municipal law”;
Foley Bros. v. Filardo 336 US 281, 285 (1949); United States v. Spelar 338 US
217, 222, (1949); and United States v. First National City Bank 321 F. 2d 14, 23, 2d
Cir., (1963). All these cases deal with “the territory” of United States. These
decisions were rendered where there was evidence of a contract, corporate charter,
or municipal law that was the subject matter of the cases. In other words, public
policy was not involved in those contracts and municipal law. The terms and
conditions were spelled out on the documents in a one on one basis. The Court
also noted in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co that territorial law is only
prima facie evidence of law. In other words, all territorial law is voluntary subject to a
higher form of evidence to the contrary.
A person must be aware that most of the following federal appellate courts decisions
fall within “a territorial” jurisdiction. see McKeal v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d
"582, 589 (9th Cir., 1983) (holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as
territorial); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir., 1964) (holding the
Federal Torts Claims Act as territorial); United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711
(2nd Cir., 1975) (holding federal wiretap laws as territorial); Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.
2d 336, 341 (2nd Cir., 1978); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609
(3rd Cir., 1984) (holding federal age discrimination laws as territorial); Thomas v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir., 1984) (holding same as Cleary,
supra): United States v. Mitchell, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir., 1977) (holding
marine mammals protection act as territorial): Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley. Jr., Co.,
755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir., 1985) (holding age discrimination laws as territorial);
Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170,
175 (8th Cir., 1959) (holding Railway Labor Act as territorial); Zahourek v. Arthur
Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir., 1984) (holding age discrimination
laws as territorial); Commodities Futures Trading Comm. v. Nahas, 738 F.2d
487,493 (D.C.C ir., 1984) (holding commission's subpoena power under federal law
as territorial): Reyes v. Secretary of H.E.W., 476 F.2d 910,. 915 (D.C Cir., 1973)
(holding administration of Social Security Act as territorial); and Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y., 1967) (holding securities act as
territorial). [Bold emphasis added]
There are no physical charters or contracts registered with the secretary of state’s
office. Also there are no municipal laws involved in “a territorial” jurisdiction, only a
presumption under the Erie RR v. Tompkins 304 US 64 doctrine that a person is
subject to diversity of citizenship. Diversity exists when a person resides in one
state subject to the jurisdiction of another state. In other words, a person lives in say
California, but has volunteered to join a social security trust. That trust is an
unincorporated association of federated states or inchoate states or state in “a
territory” under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. Said situation is also called a “conflict of law”
between Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 (“a territory”) and Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1. (“the territory”)
In other words, a conflict of law exists because of diversity. If a “person” wants their
sovereignty along with its Constitutional Rights and not civil rights, all that a person
has to do is create the evidence in law to destroy the social security trust that that
“person” is a member thereof. It’s not easy to accomplish, it takes a lot of dedicated
learning, but then anything worthwhile is not easy.
“A territorial” jurisdiction falls under private international law where unilateral
contracts are the rule as opposed to; “the territorial” law of bilateral contracts
(Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1) that is the rule of law.
The Social Security Act is the target of this writing because social security is an
unincorporated association that is not a part of the municipal law of the United
States or its headquarters would not be in Baltimore Maryland. The Social Security
Administration comes under private international law and not municipal law
therefore, within “a territorial” jurisdiction. i.e., Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, and the (J)
udicial (p)ower of amendment 11.
The Verlinden case is a good example of how not to mix case law as evidenced
above such as decisions describing “the territory” jurisdiction with decisions
describing “a territory”. In Verlinden v. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983),
the court discussed the distinction between “jurisdictional statutes” and “the federal
law under which an action arises for (j)udical (P)ower for Art. III purposes.” The
Court recognized that pure jurisdictional statutes which seek to do nothing more
than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases cannot support Art. III “arising
under” jurisdiction. Particular class of cases meaning members of the social
security trust, an unincorporated association.
The words “arising under … laws of the United States” have chiefly been construed
in cases involving not Article III directly, but the statutory grant of federal question
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and its predecessors, which is cast in the same
language. It is universally acknowledged, however, that the statutory grant does not
exhaust the constitutional power, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969);
see National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 613-14
(1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Mishkin supra, at 160-63; Note on the effect of
the Statutory Adoption of the Constitutional Language, Hart & Wechsler, supra, at
870; Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3562
(1975).
From Article III –Arising Under Jurisdiction 76 L.Ed 2d 831. It should be remembered
when raising or defending against the assertion that a particular action is not within
the scope of the "arising under" clause of Article III § 2, clause 1 that the question is
not whether the "arising under" clause authorizes the action to be brought in the
federal courts, but whether Congress is authorized by that clause to allow by statute
for such a claim to be brought there. This distinction is particularly important when a
suit is brought under the authority of the general federal question jurisdictional
statute (28 USCS § 1331), since the jurisdiction provided by § 1331 is narrower
than the jurisdiction Congress is empowered to give by the "arising under" clause.
In Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 76 L Ed 2d 81; 461 U.S. 480, 491
(1983), the court made note that the Court of Appeals decision it reversed
concerning the scope of the "arising under" clause relied heavily on decisions
construing § 1331, placing particular emphasis on the so called "well-pleaded
complaint" rule, which provides for purposes of statutory "arising under" jurisdiction,
that the federal question must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and
may not enter in anticipation of a defense. According to the Supreme Court,
“the reliance on those decisions was misplaced. Thus, the case is a good
example of the caution one should use in making sure that the cases being
relied upon to answer jurisdictional questions are not discussing statutory
jurisdiction when the question concerns Article III jurisdiction, or vice
versa.” The reason given for this distinction is that there exists policy
consideration i.e., an unincorporated association under Erie RR underlying
the purpose of the jurisdictional statute that limit its application and which do
not enter into the picture when construing the constitutional authorization for
statutory federal question jurisdiction.” In other words, 14th amendment “persons”
come within the preview of “a territorial” jurisdiction under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 that
is governed by Article 1 legislative courts with its decisions based upon a public
trust.
Court decisions based upon a public trust cannot be used in a case that involves
cases where the subject matter of the case involves a written contract, physical
charter or municipal law or direct constitutional issues that involves Article III courts.
The same is true in the reverse. Article III decisions cannot be used in cases
involving the public trust. In other words, Article I legislative courts espouse rules
and regulations that encompasses public policy under Erie RR v. Tompkins 304 US
64. Article I courts have jurisdiction over “citizen persons” of the unincorporated
association under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, and Article I Sec. 8 cls. 3 and 9 to the
Constitution to wit:
3. To regulate Commerce … among the several States … . [Bold emphasis
added.
9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,
Are you beginning to see why the courts react like they do to the Gobbledegook
that is entered into the courts.
As noted in Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, there is no charter of incorporation by HJR 192 of
the newly created several federal states and just what its duties are, i.e., its intents
and purposes; instead there is a resulting or implied (charitable) trust is formed by
operation of law.2 In other words, Congress created the conditions for a resulting
or implied trust with HJR 192. Under HJR 192, and Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2, public policy
determined there is no separation of powers doctrine thus the Union of several
states is nonexistent; instead there is a federation of inchoate states under private
international law3 termed “a territory”. The courts take judicial notice of HJR 192,
and the above Erie RR, and O’Donoghue cases and public policies view of the
several states as a federation of states under the Constitution.
“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of
States, or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of
public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between the federal and state governments for the ‘protection’ of
individuals.” New York v. U.S.,505 U.S. 144. (1992)
When it comes to 14th amendment “persons”, there is a presumption that diversity
of citizenship exists because that person is a beneficiary of the social security trust,
thus “subject to” Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 to create a “conflict of law”. In other words, a
“person” is straddling the fence and must make a decision with evidence which law
that person is subject to. Silence is consent under private international law, i.e.,
Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2 “persons” reside in “a territory” thus have no standing to quote
the above New York v. U.S. case.
The United States has no territorial jurisdiction over non-federally owned areas
inside the territorial jurisdiction of the states in the American Union. The question
becomes, what territorial jurisdiction are we talking about? When it comes to
agencies of the United States government as mentioned above, there is only one
territory and that is “a territory” of Article IV Sec. 3 cl.2. There are no states with
boundary lines that are comprised of members of a private unincorporated
association of 14th amendment “persons” that are beneficiaries to the social
security charitable trust. In other words, they are members of the several inchoate
states as noted in O’Donoghue that have no definitive borders as has the American
Union of states under Article IV Sec. 3 cl.1.
Lee Brobst
______________________________________________
1 Please take note: When it comes to public policy UNDER ARTICLE IV SECTION 3
CL.2 WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, WITH THE
DIFFERENT LAW FORUMS SUCH AS THE COMMON LAW, ADMIRALTY-MARITIME,
CIVIL LAW, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, LAW AS
OPPOSED TO EQUITY HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED AND ARE NOW TREATED AS
ONE AND THE SAME. THIS IS WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT IN NOT ONLY
UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS HAPPENING TO AMERICA BUT EVEN MORE
DIFFICULT ISPUTTING IT ON PAPER. YOU THE READER, WILL NOTICE THAT I
KEEP REPEATING ISSUES BECAUSE I WANT THE READER TO VIEW THE ISSUES
OF LAW IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT HOPING THE READER WILL FIND A NITCH IN
UNDERSTANDING. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM I HAVE IS DE-PROGRAMING
PEOPLE FROM BAD MISINFORMATION.
2 Operation of law. This term expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes
liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular
transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or co-operation of the
party himself. Black’s Law Dict. 5th ed.
3 A State of the United States is not a "state" under international law since by its
constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct foreign relations. United
States alone, not any of its constituent States, enjoys international sovereignty and
nationhood. "In respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As
to such purposes the State does not exist." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
(1937).
Last Updated on Tuesday, 28 April 2009 11:39
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